Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making by Joiner, Charles W. & Miller, Oscar J.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 5 
1957 
Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making 
Charles W. Joiner 
University of Michigan Law School 
Oscar J. Miller 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History 
Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 
MICH. L. REV. 623 (1957). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol55/iss5/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 55 MARCH 1957 No. 5 
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
A STUDY OF JUDICIAL RULE MAKINGt 
Charles W. Joiner* and Oscar]. Miller** 
T HE rule-making power of the courts in the United States is is brought into focus wherever procedural reform is under-
taken. As more and more states have undertaken rev1s1on of 
judicial procedures, the power and authority of courts to promul-
gate rules of practice and the definition of the scope of such rules 
have claimed increasingly the attention of legal writers.1 This 
trend can be attributed in part to a growing realization that 
statutes governing practice and procedure in courts, enacted by 
legislatures meeting every year or two, have failed to achieve 
that minimum standard in the administration of justice neces-
sary to satisfy the demands of a modern and complex society. 
Representative of the legal literature is the constructive criticism 
to be found in the stimulating and thought-provoking article by 
Dean Roscoe Pound, in which the defects of legislative regula-
tion of court procedure and practice were spotlighted.2 That 
t This paper was prepared for the guidance of a Committee on Michigan Procedural 
Revision jointly created by the Michigan Legislature, the Supreme Court of Michigan, 
and the Michigan State Bar to recommend revision of Michigan procedural statutes and 
rules. The division of responsibility for court procedure between the courts and the 
legislature was thought to be so fundamental that this paper was prepared as the first 
basic study for the consideration of the committee. In it an attempt is made to bring 
to the attention of the Michigan lawyers, judges, and legislators the experience of other 
states and an analysis of that experience together with suggestions as to which portions 
of the regulations pertaining to the administration of justice should be promulgated by 
court rule and which should be enacted by statute. We hope that this discussion will 
also be useful elsewhere in the field of procedural reform.-The Authors. 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan; A.B. 1937, J.D. 1939, State University of 
Iowa; member, Iowa and Michigan Bars; Chairman, Joint Committee of the Michigan 
Judicial Conference, Michigan Legislature and Michigan State Bar on Michigan Pro-
cedural Revision.-Ed. 
•• Research Assistant, University of Michigan Law School; A.B. 1953, LL.B. 1956, Uni-
versity of Michigan; member, Michigan Bar.-Ed. 
1 See bibliographies in 6 ORE. L. REv. 36 (1926); 16 A.B.A.J. 199 (1930); 51 W. VA. 
L. Q. 34 (1948); selected bibliography in A.B.A., JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, MONOGRAPH, 
Series A (1942) 18. 
2 Pound, "Regulating Procedural Details by Rules of Court," 13 A.B.A.J. 12 (1927). 
The defects are lack of knowledge and expertness by legislators, division of responsibility 
between the judiciary and legislature, personal political interests of legislators, failure of 
legislative regulation to achieve simplicity, and difficulty of securing amendatory legislation. 
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such criticisms are well-founded is apparent from the vigorous 
and continuing procedural revisions involving the use of the 
rule-making power which have taken place in so many jurisdic-
tions during the past twenty-five years.3 It is the purpose of this 
paper to survey and discuss the sources and scope of the rule-
making power and the extent to which it can and should be exer-
cised. 
I. SOURCES OF RULE-MAKING POWER 
The existence of a rule-making power in the courts has been 
recognized as a historical development stemming from early 
English law.4 One commentator dates the earliest known rule 
of court at 1457,5 the thirty-fifth year of the reign of Henry VI. 
Various sources have been assigned as the foundation upon which 
the rule-making power rests. While one court has refused to 
promulgate rules of civil procedure in the absence of a legisla-
tive enabling act, and some members of the same court stated 
that the entire matter of rule making is not within the scope of 
judicial power, 6 a majority of states have recognized and held that 
courts possess an inherent power to regulate proceedings and 
facilitate the administration of justice by the promulgation of 
rules of practice.7 
3VANDERBILT, MINI!IIUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISfRATION 142 (1949): Alabama, 
1940 (equity rules only); Arizona, 1940; California, 1943 (appellate procedure); Colorado, 
1941; Delaware, 1948; Georgia, 1947; Indiana, 1940 (revised 1946, 1948); Iowa, 1943; 
Maryland, 1941 (revised 1945, 1948); New Jersey, 1948; New Mexico, 1941; Pennsylvania, 
1937 (and various times since); South Dakota, 1939; Texas, 1941 (revised 1948); Washing-
ton, 1938; and Wisconsin, 1939 (and various times since). 
For more recent revisions, see state-by-state analysis in INSTITUTE OF J~DICIAL AD111IN-
ISfRATION, RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE COURTS Gune 1955). Florida, 1954, 1955; Terri-
tory of Hawaii, 1954; Idaho, 1951; Kentucky, 1953; Minnesota, 1952; Nevada, 1953; New 
Jersey, 1953; New Mexico, 1949; Utah, 1950; a;nd Virginia, 1950. For Illinois supreme 
court rules, effective January 1, 1956, see Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 110, §§101.1 to 101.72. 
4 Tyler, "The Origin of the Rule-Making Power and Its Exercise by Legislatures," 
22 A.B.A.J. 772 (1936). 
5 TIDD, '[HE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH, 3d ed., xli (1840). 
6 Petition of the Florida State Bar Association for Promulgation of New Florida 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 145 Fla. 223, 199 S. 57 (1940). 
7 For a collection of cases from 42 states see annotations, Power of Court To Prescribe 
Rules of Pleadings, Practice, or Procedure, 110 A.L.R. 23 (1937); 158 A.L.R. 706 (1945). 
Typical comments and holdings are shown by the following cases: Burney v. Lee, 
59 Ariz. 360 at 363, 129 P. (2d) 308 (1942): "It has been held almost unanimously from 
time immemorial that courts have the inherent power to prescribe rules of practice and 
rules to regulate their own proceedings in order to facilitate the determination of justice, 
without any express permission from the legislative branch." Kolkman v. People, 89 
Colo. 8 at 33, 300 P. 575 (1931): " ... the question with which we are concerned is 
the right, irrespective of the statutes and the common law, but in conformity with con-
stitutional provisions, to make rules with reference to procedural matters for the conduct 
of judicial trials. This is inherent in the judicial department." Gyure v. Sloan Valve Co., 
367 Ill. 489 at 493, 11 N.E. (2d) 963 (1937): "This court has not only the inherent power 
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Notwithstanding the fact that so many courts assert inherent 
power to promulgate rules of practice, an overwhelming majority 
of the same and other courts have also recognized the validity of 
enabling legislation and have held it to constitute a valid source 
of rule-making power.8 At the least, such legislation is the cata-
lyst necessary for some courts to make rules of practice. 
It has been contended that the legislature cannot by statutory 
enactment confer rule-making authority upon the judicial branch, 
on the ground that this would constitute an invalid delegation 
of legislative powers.9 In a leading case, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court rejected this contention, holding in an extensive opinion 
that the rule-making power for judicial procedure is essentially 
a judicial function and such a statute did not delegate purely 
legislative powers to the judiciary.10 Lending support to the 
conclusion of the Wisconsin court is a recent survey showing that 
general rule-making power grounded upon statutory enabling 
legislation exists in nineteen states, with the courts of twenty-
five other states having had a more limited rule-making power 
conferred upon them by legislative action.11 
A third source of the rule-making power is express constitu-
tional grant,12 by which the court is specifically authorized or di-
rected by the constitution to make rules of practice and procedure. 
The constitutions of four states contain provisions granting general 
and complete rule-making power to the court.13 Thus three 
sources of rule-making power must be examined as the basis of 
procedural reform. 
While the court's inherent power to make rules of procedure 
to prescribe rules of practice and procedure, but the power is expressly conferred by the 
statute." Epstein v. State, 190 Ind. 693 at 696, 127 N.E. 441 (1920): "This court is a 
constitutional court, and as such receives its" essential and inherent powers, rights and 
jurisdiction from the Constitution, and not from the legislature, and it has power to 
prescribe rules for its own direct government independent of legislative enactment.'' 
State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397 at 420, 60 P. (2d) 646 (1936): "We therefore hold that the 
trial court rules . . . were promulgated . . • by this court in the exercise of an inherent 
power lodged in us to prescribe such rules of practice, pleading, and procedure as will 
facilitate the administration of justice.'' 
8 For a collection of cases from 33 states see annotations, Power of Court To Prescribe 
Rules of Pleadings, Practice, or Procedure, 110 A.L.R. 28 (1937); 158 A.L.R. 707 (1945). 
9 Walsh, "Rule-Making Power on the Law Side of Federal Practice," 13 A.B.A.J. 
87 at 91 (1927). 
10 Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931). 
11 VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISfRATION 134 (1949). 
12 Id. at 135. 
13 MD. CONST. (ratified in 1944), art. IV, §!Ba; MICH. CONST. (1908), art. VII, §5; 
Mo. CONST. (1945), art. V, §5; N.J. CoNST. (1947), art. 6, §II, 1[3. 
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has been asserted14 and denied15 by individual writers, it is sub-
mitted that the only fair question in this respect is not whether in-
herent power exists at all, but rather, what is the scope of such 
power? It seems "irrefutable that courts possess a certain measure 
of inherent rule-making power.16 For example, the courts have 
exercised inherent rule-making power in establishing the re-
quirements for admission to the bar, and this power is almost 
universally recognized throughout the United States.17 Typical 
of the attitude of the courts is the Michigan decision of People 
v. Brown.18 Inherent rule-making power of a trial court was ·up-
held by the supreme court, with the statement that a court has 
an "inherent right to function and function efliciently."19 The 
court held that a method of impanelling juries provided for by 
court rule was valid. Thus while the precise scope of the inherent 
rule-making power may be debatable, its existence in some measure 
seems clear. 
The Michigan Constitution of 1908 expressly grants rule-
making power to the court in the following language: "The 
supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify and amend 
the practice in such court and in all other courts of record, 
and simplify the same."20 A similar provision was found in the 
Constitution of 1850.21 Thus the Michigan Supreme Court has 
not only inherent rule-making power, but also rule-making 
power stemming from an express constitutional grant. Only 
recently that court emphasized both the "inherent as well as 
constitutional rule-making power" in sustaining court rules pro-
viding for discovery before trial. 22 
Because of the broad inherent ~nd constitutional rule-making 
power possessed by the Supreme Court of Michigan, there is no 
need for enabling legislation granting rule-making power to that 
court. Thus the delegation of powers argument, thoroughly 
discredited by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,23 would seem to 
14 Gertner, "The Inherent Power of Courts To Make Rules," 10 UNIV. CIN. L. R:Ev. 
32 (1936). 
15 Williams, "The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure,'' 22 
WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 459 (1937). 
1.6 Petition of Florida State Bar Association for the Adoption of Rules for Practice 
and Procedure, (Fla. 1945) 21 S. (2d) 605; 110 A.L.R. 23 (1937); 158 A.L.R. 706 (1945). 
17 For a collection of cases see Green, "The Court's Power Over Admission and Dis-
barment," 4 TEX. L. R:Ev. 1 at 12, n. 35 (1925). 
18238 Mich. 298, 212 N.W. 968 (1927). 
19 People v. Brown, 238 Mich. 298 at 300, 212 N.W. 968 (1927). 
20 MICH. CONST. (1908), art. VII, §5. 
21 MICH. CONST. (1850), art. VI, §5. 
22 Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 338 Mich. 274 at 276, 61 N.W. (2d) 102 (1953). 
23 Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931). 
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have no application in this state. The Michigan legislature has, 
however, enacted legislation specifically charging the court with 
responsibility for establishing by "general rules" the practice 
in the supreme court and courts of record.2•1 The court is also 
charged with the responsibility of revising the rules every two 
years to obtain certain improvements in the practice.25 At a 
different time the legislature passed a statute charging the court 
with responsibility for appellate practice in the supreme court 
and other courts of record.26 Although such legislation added 
nothing to the court's power, and although in the first statute it 
was limited to situations "not provided for by statute," it is hearten-
ing to note the spirit of cooperation existing beween these two 
great branches of government and the frank recognition by a 
coordinate branch of government of the judiciary's responsibility 
to provide for rules of practice. This fine spirit should be help-
ful in carrying out a procedural revision program involving 
a full definition and exercise of the court's rule-making power. 
II. SCOPE OF THE RULE-MAKING POWER 
As indicated above, the really significant issue in the area 
of rule-making is not the existence or the source but the actual 
24 P.A. 314, §14 (1915), being Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §601.14: "The justices of 
the supreme court shall have power, and it shall be their duty, by general rules to 
establish, and from time to time thereafter to modify and amend, the practice in such 
court, and in all other courts of record. . . ." 
25 Ibid: " ••. and they shall, once at least in every 2 years thereafter, if necessary, 
revise the said rules, with the view to the attainment, so far as may be practicable, of 
the following improvements in the practice: 
I. The abolishing of distinctions between law and equity proceedings, as far as 
practicable; 
2. The abolishing of all fictions and unnecessary process and proceedings; 
3. The simplifying and abbreviating of the pleadings and proceedings; 
4. The expediting of the decisions of causes; 
5. The regulation of costs; 
6. The remedying of such abuses and imperfections as may be found to exist in the 
practice; 
7. The abolishing of all unnecessary forms and technicalities in pleading and practice; 
8. To effectively prevent the defeat or abatement of any civil suit, ex contractu, for 
either any nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties, where the same can be done consistently 
with justice; 
9. To provide for all necessary amendments of process, pleadings, or other proceed-
ings in such case; and 
10. To provide the manner by which a discontinuance may be entered against 
parties improperly joined in any suit, and by which parties improperly omitted may be 
joined in the suit and brought in to answer thereto, if within the jurisdiction of the court." 
26P.A. 27 (1929), being Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §691.21: "The supreme court 
may, by general rules, provide simplified forms, methods, and procedure by which such 
court and other courts of record shall exercise the appellate jurisdiction conferred upon 
them by law, and such rules, while in force, shall be controlling, any statutory provision 
to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, That no right to a review conferred or 
preserved by the constitution of this state shall thereby be denied or diminished." 
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scope of the rule-making power. In ascertaining and determining 
its scope, the frame of reference will be the three power sources, 
exami:q.ed in the light of political theory, case law, and the historical 
distinction between substance and procedure. 
A. Inherent Power To Make Rules 
In Michigan, as in the political structure of the federal gov-
ernment and many states, the powers of government are divid-
ed in the traditional American pattern between the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches.27 The judicial power is vested 
in the constitutionally created courts and such other courts as 
may be created by the legislature.28 Wigmore argued in an 
editorial29 referring to the pattern of government in Illinois 
(similar in this respect to that of Michigan) that all legislatively 
created rules of practice and procedure were constitutionally 
void, basing his argument on the logic of the constitution itself 
and the policy and experience with court rules and legislatively 
prescribed procedure. Two courts have recognized the validity 
of this argument.30 In other words, giving effect in fullest meas-
ure to the theory of separation of powers, the judicial branch, 
and only the judicial branch, would be authorized to promulgate 
rules regulating court procedure. Some writers have taken 
Wigmore's argument as a jeu d'esprit31 while another has taken 
it as a serious attempt to justify the judiciary's exercise of a com-
plete and exclusive rule-making power.32 However, the better 
interpretation of Wigmore's editorial would seem to be that 
he was pointing up the supremacy of judicially created rules 
of practice and procedure in the event of conflict with legis-
lative rules and refuting the legislators who argued that rule 
making was a legislative power and could not constitutionally 
be delegated to the judicial branch. 
27 MICH. CONST., art. IV, §1: "The powers of government are divided into three 
departments: the legislative, executive, and judicial." 
28 MICH. CONST., art. VII, §1: "The judicial power shall be vested in one supreme 
court, circuit courts, probate courts, justices of the peace and such other courts of civil 
and criminal jurisdiction, inferior to the supreme court, as the legislature may establish 
by general law, by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house." 
29 Wigmore, "All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally," 
23 ILL. L. R.Ev. 276 (1928). 
30 Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931); Epstein v. State, 190 Ind. 693, 
128 N.E. 353 (1920). 
31 Kaplan and Greene, "The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An 
Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury," 65 HARv. L. REv. 234 (1951). 
32 Green, "To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe 
Rules of Evidence?" 26 A.B.A.J. 482 (1940). 
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As interpreted by Dean Pound, Wigmore's proposition was 
that "if every power exercisable in government must go ex-
clusively and as a whole into one of the three categories, the 
power of making detailed rules of legal procedure is analyti-
cally judicial-it is inherent in the exercise of the power com-
mitted to the judiciary of determining controversies and ap-
plying laws."88 It is submitted that Wigmore was underlining 
the fallacy of a strictly logical chain of reasoning as concerns 
the classification of those powers exercisable by the three branches 
of government. In this connection it should be remembered 
that political science has also abandoned the theory of complete 
and exclusive authority over precisely delineated spheres of 
activity.84 It is well established that the operational areas of 
everyday governmental functions are not defined with preci-
sion and are not capable of assignment to distinctive categories; 
instead there is and always has been a twilight zone of indefi.ni-
tion, wherein the functions and activities of the three branches 
overlap and conflict, and wherein cooperation among the three 
branches has been the key to the resolution of the conceptual 
puzzle. Therefore, it is submitted that while a purely theoretical 
argument can be made for total and exclusive possession of the 
rule-making power by the judiciary, such a position ignores the 
realities of practical operational techniques necessarily utilized in 
government and presumes that a total separation of powers is 
possible. The conclusion should rather be that theory must give 
way to reality: It must be recognized that there are areas in 
which it is not clear whether the legislature or the judiciary 
should establish the necessary rules. 
The ultimate solution to a definition of the scope of judicial 
rule-making power ·will turn upon an answer to the question, 
power to make rules to do what? The purpose of the rule is 
essential to its proper classification. Thus while it is clear that 
inherent rule-making power is possessed by the courts, the scope 
of the power cannot be defined until we ascertain the purpose 
for which a rule is promulgated and the fullness of its impact. 
If the purpose of its promulgation is to permit a court to func-
tion and function efficiently, the rule-making power is inherent85 
88 Pound, "Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey," 66 HAR.v. L. REv. 28 
at 37 (1952). 
84 GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE Am,nNISTRATIVE LAW 20 (1893); UHLER, REVIEW OF ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE ACTS 23 (1942); CHEEVER AND HAVILAND, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS (1952); WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
2d ed., 679-682 (1938). 
85 People v. Brown, 238 Mich. 298, 212 N.W. 968 (1927). 
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unless its impact is such as to conflict with other validly enacted 
legislative or constitutional policy involving matters other than the 
orderly dispatch of judicial business. Similarly, with the same lim-
itations, the power is inherent to establish the requirements for 
admission to the bar,36 to punish for contempt,37 to incur and 
order paid expenses necessary for holding court and the dis-
charge of the duties thereof, 38 to make rules with reference to 
procedural matters for the conduct of trials,39 to require ap-
pellate briefs to contain a concise statement of the errors and ex-
ceptions relied upon,40 and to investigate the conduct of court 
officers. 41 
Classified by Pound as proper subjects for rules of court 
are ". . . the orderly dispatch of judicial business, the sav-
ing of public time, and the maintenance of the dignity of tri-
bunals."42 As defined by Dowling, inherent power is that which 
"is essential to the existence, dignity, and functions of the court 
as a constitutional tribunal and from the very fact that is is a 
court .... "43 A shorthand statement might be that the courts 
may provide for the "how" in the courts; the legislators, the 
"what." Thus when the purpose of the rule is to provide for 
the establishment and maintenance of the machinery essential 
for the efficient administration of judicial business, and it does 
only that, the scope of the inherent power vested in the courts 
is complete and supreme. 
B. Express Constitutional Grant 
The Michigan Supreme Court is a court created by the 
constitution.44 The constitution provides that it "shall by gen-
eral rules establish, modify and amend the practice in such 
court and in all other courts of record, and simplify the same,"45 
and that it "shall have a general superintending control over all 
inferior courts. . . ."46 In determining the scope of the con-
36 In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899). 
37 Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338 (1883); Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N.E. 199 (1896). 
38 Stowell v. Bd. of Supervisors, 57 Mich. 31, 23 N.W. 557 (1885); Schmelzel v. Bel. 
of County Commrs., 16 Idaho 32, 100 P. 106 (1909). 
39 Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931). 
40 Epstein v. State, 190 Ind. 693, 128 N.E. 353 (1920). 
41 Emmons v. Smitt, (E.D. Mich. 1944) 58 F. Supp. 869, affd. (6th Cir. 1945) 149 F. 
(2d) 869. 
42 Pound, "Canons of Procedural Reform," 51 A.B.A. REP. 290 at 298 (1926). 
43 Dowling, "The Inherent Power of the Judiciary," 21 A.B.A.J. 635 at 636 (1935). 
44 MICH. CONST., art. VII, §I. 
45 Id., §5. 
46Id., §4. 
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stitutional rule-making power, the key word is "practice." Thus 
it is initially necessary to determine the breadth of meaning of 
the word "practice" as used in this constitutional provision. 
Procedural law has been defined as "the method of enforc-
ing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion,''47 and as 
"the machinery for carrying on the suit."48 Practice has been 
defined as "the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is 
enforced, as distinguished from the law which gives or defines 
the right, and which by means of the proceeding the Court is 
to administer the machinery as distinguished from the prod-
uct."49 Similarly, "practice includes the formula by which that 
power is first asserted and afterward exercised in respect to any 
litigation in all its phases, until the same is finally completed."50 
As stated by the Illinois Supreme Court, "The 'proceedings 
and practice' of the courts must be construed to mean the form 
in which actions are brought and the manner of conducting and 
carrying on suits."51 
In a leading English case, 52 the court was confronted with 
an alleged distinction between the words "practice" and "pro-
cedure." A "rule of procedure" of the Judicature Act of 187353 
provided that " . . . Any judgment of nonsuit, unless the 
Court or a Judge otherwise directs, shall have the same effect 
as a judgment upon the merits for the defendant ... "54 said 
rule being applicable only to the High Court of Justice. Under 
authority of the County Courts Act,55 the same rule was made 
applicable to county court proceedings. In the instant case, 
plaintiff had instituted an action and was nonsuited, with no 
direction otherwise. Some eight months later the plaintiff in-
stituted another action on the same cause, and received judg-
47 Mix v. Bd. of County Commrs., 18 Idaho 695 at 709, 112 P. 215 (1910). 
48 Jones v. Erie R. Co., 106 Ohio St. 408 at 412, 140 N.E. 365 (1922). 
49 Poyser v. Minors, 7 Q. B. D. 329 at 333 (1881). 
50In re McCormick's Estate, 72 Ore. 608 at 616, 144 P. 425 (1914). 
51 People v. Raymond, 186 Ill. 407 at 414-415, 57 N.E. 1065 (1900). 
52 Poyser v. Minors, 7 Q. B. D. 329 at 333 (1881). 
53 Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Viet., c. 65. 
54 Id., Rule 46 of Schedule. 
55 County Courts Act of 1856, 19 & 20 Viet., c. 108, §32: "The Lord Chancellor may 
appoint five county court Judges, and from time to time fill up any vacancies in their 
number, to frame rules and orders for regulating the practice of the courts, and forms 
of proceedings therein, and from time to time to amend such rules, orders, and forms; 
and such rules, orders, and forms, or amended rules, orders, and forms, certified under 
the hands of such Judges or any three or more of them, shall be submitted to the Lord 
Chancellor, who may allow or disallow or alter the same; and the rules, orders, and 
forms, or amended rules, orders, and forms, so allowed or altered, shall, from a day to 
be named by the Lord Chancellor, be in force in every: county court.'' 
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ment. The defendant urged the court rule on appeal as a 
bar to this .second action, while plaintiff contended that the 
court rule was ultra vires as concerned county courts because 
the rule was initially promulgated as a "rule of procedure" under 
the Judicature Act of 1873, whereas the County Court Act pro-
vision56 permitted the promulgation of "practice" rules only. 
In construing the grant of rule-making power under the Judica-
ture and County Court Acts, Lush, L. J., rejected the alleged 
distinction between "practice" and "procedure," and stated as 
-follows: "'practice,' in its larger sense-the sense in which it was 
obviously used in that Act, like 'procedure' which is used in the 
Judicature Acts, denotes the mode of proceeding by which a legal 
right is enforced, as distinguished from the law which gives or 
defines the right, and which by means of the proceeding the Court 
is to administer the machinery as distinguished from its product. 
'Practice,' and 'procedure,' as applied to this subject, I take to be 
convertible terms."57 Lord Justice Lush's analysis seems to be the 
generally accepted view in the United States.58 
56 County Courts Act of 1856, 19 & 20 Viet., c. 108, §32: " ... to frame rules and 
orders for regulating the practice of the courts, and the forms of proceedings therein. 
• • ." Emphasis added. 
57 Poyser v. Minors, 7 Q. B. D. 329 at 333-334 (1881). 
58 Morris v. City of Newark, 73 N.J.L. 268 at 270, 62 A. 1005 (1906). An act was 
passed regulating the determination of compensation due for property condemned for 
public use. The practice under this act was to supersede existing practice except in 
condemnation situations of taking land for public use where benefits could be set off 
against damage awards. Contention was made that the exception applied only to practice 
and not to procedure. In rejecting this contention, the court said: " ... we think 
'practice' was used by the legislature as synonymous with procedure, and hence includes 
the tribunal as well as the conduct of matters before it." 
Estate of Morrison, 125 Cal. App. 504 at 508, 14 P. (2d) 102 (1932). A statute pre-
scribed that proceedings in probate courts should be governed by rules of practice appli-
cable to civil actions. Another statute provided that civil actions be dismissed if not 
brought to trial within 5 years after answer was filed. A will contest in probate was so 
dismissed and appeal was taken on the ground that the 5-year statute was not a rule of 
practice, and thus was not applicable to probate proceedings. The appellate court said: 
"Rules of practice are designed to establish the manner of bringing parties into court, 
and when they are there, prescribe the course to be followed by the parties and the 
court throughout the various stages of the litigation, in hearing, dealing with, and dis-
posing of the matters in dispute. The purpose is to harmonize and facilitate the conduct 
of litigation; and since such rules deal with all phases of a case from its inception to 
final judgment, the time within which an action or proceeding shall either be brought 
to trial or dismissed as burdensome to an adversary and to the court as well, is a proper 
subject for an administrative formula in aid of a definite and uniform mode of procedure." 
People v. Central Pac. R. Co., 83 Cal. 393 at 403-404, 23 P. 303 (1890). A constitu-
tional provision prohibited the legislature from passing local or special laws regulating 
the practice of courts of justice. A statute for taxation of railroads authorized a different 
form of complaint in such cases than was proper under the Code of Civil Procedure. In 
rejecting the contention that the statute related only to pleading and not to practice, the 
court said: "It is evident that the words of this inhibitory clause of the constitution are 
used in their general sense, and in that sense, the words 'practice of courts of justice' 
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By virtue of its constitutional rule-making authority to pre-
scribe rules of "practice," using a broad definition of practice, the 
Michigan Supreme Court has held valid a court rule provid-
ing for the taxation as costs of a bond premium,119 a court rule 
that after an answer plaintiff may discontinue upon notice and 
payment of costs only on stipulation, or by order of the court 
on a motion supported by affidavit, 60 a court rule authorizing the 
issuance of an alias attachment writ, 61 a court rule adopting 
a circuit court rule providing that an order staying execution 
shall be inoperative unless a writ of error be issued within ten 
days after the settlement of a bill of exceptions, 62 a circuit court 
rule shortening the time for making a default absolute,63 a rule 
providing for the time within which appearance should be made 
on notice to plead, 64 a circuit court rule authorizing a friend of 
the court to initiate contempt proceedings on a failure to pay 
include all 'pleadings.' . . . It is impossible to contemplate the subject of 'practice of 
the courts of justice,' and eliminate from the mind all thought of 'pleading.' " 
Wright v. State, 5 Ind. 290 at 294, 61 Am. Dec. 90 (1854): An 1843 statute provided, 
"If at the expiration of the time fixed by law for the continuance of the term of any 
court, the trial of a cause shall be progressing, said court may continue its sitting beyond 
such time, and require the attendance of the jury and witnesses, and do, transact, and 
enforce all other matters which shall be necessary for the determination of such cause; 
and in such case, the term of said court shall not be deemed to be ended, until the cause 
shall have been fully disposed of by said court.'' This statute was not carried over in 
the 1852 revision, but an omnibus section of the 1852 revision did provide that "the 
laws . • • relative to pleading and practice, in criminal actions • . . as far as the same 
may operate in aid hereof, or to supply any omitted case, are hereby continued in force.'' 
Contention was made that the 1843 statute did not relate to "practice" so as to be con-
tinued in force by virtue of the omnibus section. In rejecting such contention, the 
court said: "All that relates to the manner and time in which a case shall be conducted 
and tried, from its inception to final judgment and execution, is generally embraced 
under the title of practice.'' 
Fleischman v. Walker, 91 Ill. 318 at 320 (1878). "The mode and order of procedure 
in obtaining compensation for an injury by action or suit in the legally established courts, 
from the inception of such suit until it ends in the final determination of the court of 
last resort, is all comprehended in the term 'practice.' " 
But see State v. Pavelich, 153 Wash. 379 at 383, 279 P. 1102 (1929): A statute, which 
provided that the court must instruct that no inference of guilt shall arise because of 
the accused's failure to testify in his own behalf, was abrogat~d by court rule. Conten-
tion was made that the court rule was not valid because it attempted to change sub-
stantive law. The court said: "While procedure is to some extent, broader than practice, 
it seldom includes substantive rights. When it does, it is by reason of some constitutional 
or fundamental right. In such case, no rule of court can abolish it. Such, as we view it, 
is not the case here. ·while practice and procedure are not always identical, they are 
always correlative. One cannot exist without the other." (It should be noted, however, 
that the court held that the court rule did not invade the realm of substantive law.) 
li9 Behr v. Baker, 257 Mich. 487, 241 N.W. 229 (1932). 
60 Pear v. Graham, 258 Mich. 161, 241 N.W. 865 (1932). 
61 Van Benschoten v. Fales, 126 Mich. 176, 85 N.W. 476 (1901). 
62 lsmond v. Scougale, 119 Mich. 501, 78 N.W. 546 (1899). 
63 Howard v. Tomlinson, 27 Mich. 168 (1873). 
64 Norvell v. McHenry, l Mich. 227 (1849). 
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alimony ordered in a separate maintenance suit, 65 court rules 
prescribing procedures for new trial, judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, and matters raised on appeal, 66 a court rule pro-
viding for pre-trial discovery, 67 court rules governing the pro-
cedures for probate appeals, 68 and court rules governing the 
procedure whereby the court obtains jurisdiction to review con-
viction and sentence in a criminal case. 69 
Considering the accepted definitions of the terms "practice" 
and "procedure," and recognizing the types of matters which 
have been held to be within the term "practice" as used in the 
rule-making grant of authority, it seems clear that the words are 
generally used synonymously. Thus it is submitted that the 
word "practice" as utilized in the Michigan constitutional pro-
vision embraces the entire area known as procedural or adjec-
tive law. It clearly embraces all "how," leaving to the legislature 
"what" in substantive law creating legal rights and duties. 
Equating "practice" with "procedure" or adjective law does 
not necessarily solve the problem of defining the full scope of 
the constitutionally granted rule-making power to control "prac-
tice."70 It is helpful in that it shows how broad is the rule-
making power but the problem of definition is ever present. It 
is fundamental that court rules cannot contravene constitutional 
provisions,11 extend or abridge jurisdiction of the court over 
the subject matter,72 abrogate or modify substantive law.73 The 
65 Gray v. Gray, (E.D. Mich. 1945) 61 F. Supp. 367. 
66 St. John v. Nichols, 331 Mich. 148, 49 N.W. (2d) 113 (1951). 
67 Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 338 Mich. 274, 61 N.W. (2d) 102 (1953). 
68 In re Koss Estate, 340 Mich. 185, 65 N.W. (2d) 316 (1954). 
69 People v. Stanley, 344 Mich. 530, 75 N.W. (2d) 39 (1956). 
70 In New Jersey a constitutional grant of power to the supreme court to make rules 
"subject to law" was interpreted as drawing the line on judicial rule making at the 
substantive-procedural distinction. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A. (2d) 406 (1950). 
This has led to a series of cases drawing the line betl\Teen substance and procedure. Thus 
in Sattelberger v. Telep, 14 N.J. 353 at 369-370, 102 A. (2d) 577 (1954), the court said: 
"Since third party practice is procedural and not substantive in nature, it is within the 
rule-making function vested in the Supreme Court by the Judicial Article of the 1947 
Constitution." Similarly, in Early v. Early, 18 N.J. Super. 280 at 284 (1952), the court said 
" ••• Rule 3:84-2 requires that an affidavit of noncollusion and verification be attached to 
the complaint or counterclaim for divorce, but this is a rule of practice and procedure 
rather than a jurisdictional requirement." In the following cases, the matters indicated 
were determined to be procedural and not substantive: State v. Ahrens, 25 N.J. Super. 201 
(1953) (form of criminal process); State v. Haines, 18 N.J. 550, 115 A. (2d) 24 (1955) (con-
tinuance of term of grand jury beyond expiration of term for which it was impanelled); 
Hager v. Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 81 A. (2d) 155 (1951) (appellate court's power, in reviewing 
causes involving issues of fact determined by jury verdict, to set aside such verdict if con-
trary to the weight of the evidence). 
71 People v. Metropolitan Surety Co., 164 Cal. 174, 128 P. 324 (1912). 
72 Ray Jewelry Co. v. Darling, 251 Mich. 157, 231 N.W. 101 (1930). 
73 Wash'n-Southem Co. v. Baltimore Co., 263 U.S. 629 (1924); Shannon v. Ottawa 
Circuit Judge, 245 Mich. 220, 222 N.W. 168 (1928). 
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general statement that court rules can neither abrogate nor modify 
matters of substance assumes that the distinction between procedure 
and substance is capable of precise delineation. But as one writer 
points out, a clear-cut distinction for all purposes is impos-
sible of formulation.74 For example, a New York statute which 
changed the burden of proof for contributory negligence was 
held to be procedural and thus applicable to pending actions,76 
while the same court held that a comparative negligence statute 
of another state would govern as to the burden of proof in an 
action brought in New York,76 indicating that burden of proof 
is substantive in nature. Thus what may be considered proce-
dural for one purpose may be considered substantive for another. 
A test to supplant the substance-procedure distinction in the 
field of evidence rule-making is stated: "whether a given rule 
of evidence is a device with which to promote the adequate, 
simple, prompt, and inexpensive administration of justice in 
the conduct of a trial or whether the rule, having nothing to do 
with procedure, is grounded upon a declaration of general public 
policy.''77 This test closely approximates the suggestion made 
above: "while it is clear that inherent rule-making power is 
possessed by the courts, the scope of the power cannot be de-
fined until we ascertain the purpose for which a rule is pro-
mulgated and the fullness of its impact. If the purpose of its 
promulgation is to permit a court to function and function ef-
ficiently, the rule-making power is inherent unless its impact is 
such as to conflict with other validly enacted legislative or con-
stitutional policy involving matters other than the orderly dis-
patch of judicial business."78 It is believed that such a test could 
be successfully used in determining whether a matter is within the 
scope of the term "practice" as used in the constitutional grant of 
rule-making power. If a particular court rule contravenes a legis-
latively declared principle of public policy, having as its basis some-
thing other than court administration, such as the doctor-patient 
privilege, the rule should yield. But where the purpose of the rule 
is to govern "practice," such as, oath administration, the rule 
should be controlling. As noted previously, rules of court which 
prescribe the methodology for initiating, conducting, and conclud-
74 Green, "To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe 
Rules of Evidence?" 26 A.B.A.J. 482 (1940). 
76 Sackheim v. Pigueron, 215 N.Y. 62, 109 N.E. 109 (1915). 
76 Fitzpatrick. v. International Ry. Co., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929). 
77 Riedl, "To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe 
Rules of Evidence?" 26 A.B.A.J. 601 at 604 (1940). 
78 See p. 629 supra. 
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ing litigation are properly within the scope of the term "practice." 
In summary it would seem that where the purpose of promulgated 
court rules is to regulate "practice," and it does only this, the con-
stitutional mandate clearly authorizes and sustains the exercise of 
rule-making power extending to all phases of the litigation proc-
ess.79 
C. Enabling Legislation 
Enabling legislation is not needed in Michigan to vest the court 
with rule-making power.80 While it might seem that two statutes81 
do delegate rule-making authority to the supreme court, it is clear 
that these statutes merely extend confirmatory recognition to power 
already possessed by the court. The court expressed this thought 
in commenting upon the appellate practice statute when it stated: 
"The court rules of 1931 and 1933 were adopted in pursuance of 
legislative desire that this court reassume its constitutional func-
tion to establish the practice."82 By such an act the legislature did 
not delegate power at all because the court already possessed, by 
virtue of the constitutional provision, the rule-making power at-
tempted to be conferred.83 Instead, the legislation confirmed the 
existing power and stimulated the court into action. 
The legislative direction to the supreme court to abolish the 
distinction between law and equity, found in section 601.14, Mich-
79 Jones v. Eastern Michigan Motorbuses, 287 Mich. 619 at 645-646, 283 N.W. 710 
(1939): On appeal from a law case tried without a jury, it was claimed that the judgment 
was against the preponderance of the evidence in accordance with Supreme Court rule 
64. Such rule was alleged by appellee to be invalid as changing substantive rights by 
changing the law review or error to the equity type review. In the course of holding that 
rule 64 was constitutional, the court said: "The issue is whether this court under the 
Constitution has the power to promulgate such a rule." After citing sections I, 4 and 5 
of Article VII of the Constitution, the court continued: "Under the above constitutional 
provisions all judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and other inferior courts 
over which the Supreme Court has supervision and control. With judicial power thus 
vested by the Constitution, it seems too clear for argument that the power to regulate 
procedure is inherently vested in the Supreme Court, to be exercised under its rule-
making powers." 
80 MICH. CONST., art. VII, §5. People v. Stanley, 344 Mich. 530, 75 N.W. (2d) 39 (1956), 
discussed p. 641 infra. St. John v. Nichols, 331 Mich. 148 at 159, 49 N.W. (2d) 113 (1951): 
In upholding court rules which prescribed procedures for new trial, judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, and matters raised on appeal, the court said: "We note, in passing, 
that the granting of a new trial here is not inconsistent with CL 1948, §691.692 (Stat. 
Ann. §27.1462). We do not base decision thereon inasmuch as the subject comes within 
the exclusive powers of this Court and is, therefore, outside the legislative province. 
(Const. 1908, art. 4, §1, 2; art. 7, §1, 5)." 
81 P.A. 314, §14 (1915), being Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §601.14. The text of this 
section is set out in note 24 supra. 
s2 In re Widening Woodward Avenue, 265 Mich. 87 at 91, 251 N.W. 379 (1933). 
S3 MICH. CONST., art. VII, §§1, 4, 5. 
1957] JUDICIAL RULE MAKING 637 
igan Compiled Laws of 1948,84 might be thought to be a delegation 
of power not theretofore held by the court. Such a conclusion 
gains plausibility from a provision of the constitution: "The leg-
islature shall, as far as practicable, abolish the distinction between 
law and equity proceedings."85 It is submitted, however, that even 
in the absence of the enabling legislation, the court has the power 
and duty to abolish the procedural distinctions and to merge the 
actions at law and in equity. 
The distinctions between law and equity are of two kinds: (1) 
practice or procedural distinctions, (2) substantive law distinc-
tions. The court by virtue of its constitutional rule-making man-
date has the power to abolish procedural distinctions between law 
and equity except for those distinctions in practice written into the 
constitution, such as jury trial. The court cannot inherently, con-
stitutionally, nor as a result of enabling legislation enact rules of 
substantive law. The court has always recognized legislative supe-
riority in this matter.86 What then is the effect of this additional 
constitutional directive to the legislature to abolish the law-equity 
distinctions? It is submitted that in the matter of abolishing the 
law-equity distinction, both the supreme court and the legislature 
possess power of accomplishment; the court under its rule-making 
power; the legislature pursuant to the special constitutional grant. 
In short, this is an area where a power is concurrently possessed 
by two branches of government with the basis therefor grounded 
in history. 
A survey of the proceedings and debates of the 1850 Michigan 
Constitutional Convention makes it obvious why the legislature 
was also assigned the function of abolishing the law-equity dis-
tinction. The convention had under consideration two plans for 
the judicial branch - the circuit system, whereby circuit court 
judges performing circuit duties would sit en bane to comprise 
the supreme court, and the independent supreme bench system, 
under which the supreme court justices performed no circuit du-
ties.87 The circuit system was existent in Michigan at the time of 
the convention. Some delegates opposed the circuit plan, pointing 
out that these courts had failed to administer justice satisfactorily, 
as a result of which it had been necessary to establish the county 
84P.A. 314, §14 (1915), being Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §601.14. 
85 MICH. CONST., art. VII, §5. 
86 Shannon v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 245 Mich. 220, 222 N.W. 168 (1928). 
87 Remarks of Mr. E. S. Moore, delegate from St. Joseph County, Report of the Pro-
ceedings and Debates, Michigan Constitutional Convention (1850) at 721-722. 
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courts.88 The judiciary and the legal profession were considered 
responsible for the extreme technicalities which existed in pro-
cedure, 89 and some delegates called for the abolition of the law-
equity distinction so as to enable cases to be tried on their merits 
rather than on procedural niceties.90 One delegate proposed that 
a board of commissioners be established to make rules of practice 
for the courts, such board being responsible to the legislature.91 
It is submitted that while the supreme court's rule-making grant 
included the power to abolish the law-equity distinction, it was the 
intention of the majority of the delegates to provide a safeguard 
against inertia and non-exercise of such power by the judiciary; 
thus the legislature was given concurrent power, to be utilized in 
case the supreme court did not act. One delegate even proposed 
an amendment to the rule-making section which would have im-
posed a duty on the supreme court to make rules,92 as compared 
with a mere authorization to promulgate rules. In short, the tenor 
of the times, as expressed in the constitutional debates, demanded 
the abolition of the law-equity distinction and the legislature was 
given an effective weapon designed to encourage the supreme court 
to take necessary action under its constitutional rule-making power. 
The result, of course, is the enabling statute referred to above. 
It is interesting to note that the direction to the legislature 
occurs in the judicial article of the constitution, not the legislative 
article. Had the convention intended this function to be carried 
out exclusively by the legislature, the direction and grant of po:wer 
would likely have been included in the article _concerned with the 
· legislative department. 
In conclusion, the court's inherent rule-making power and that 
expressly granted by the constitution would seem to be very broad, 
permitting the promulgation of rules which cover all phases of the 
litigation process, from inception of the action to final judgment 
and execution, including matters of pleading, evidence, and trial 
procedure. Thus enabling legislation and its problem of delega-
tion of powers present no obstacles to procedural revision in 
88 Remarks of Mr. A. S. Robertson, delegate from Macomb County, Report of the 
Proceedings and Debates, Michigan Constitutional Convention (1850) at 728-729; Remarks 
of Mr. A. H. Hanscom, delegate from Oakland County, Report of the Proceedings and 
Debates, Michigan Constitutional Convention (1850) at 711. 
89 Remarks of Mr. E. S. Moore, delegate from St. Joseph County, Report of the Pro-
ceedings and Debates, Michigan Constitutional Convention (1850) at 721. 
90 Id. at 596. 
91Ibid. 
92 Remarks of Mr. A. S. Robertson, delegate from Macomb County, Report of the 
Proceedings and Debates, Michigan Constitutional Convention (1850) at 809. 
1957] JUDICIAL RULE MAKING 639 
Michigan. Such legislation adds nothing to the powers already 
held by the court except to confirm them and to provide a happy 
climate of common purpose in the accomplishment of procedural 
reform. 
D. Supplementary Legislation 
The promulgation of court rules by the Michigan Supreme 
Court has been sporadic, piecemeal, and incomplete. During the 
territorial period both court rules and statutes governed matters 
of practice, the rules being promulgated pursuant to legislation of 
the Legislature of the Michigan Territory,93 and this precedent 
was followed during the period 1835-1850 under Michigan's first 
constitution.94 The constitution of 1850 vested the rule-making 
power in the supreme court.95 Under this grant of power some 
court rules were promulgated between 1853-1930,96 but the vast 
bulk of practice regulations were created by statute. Because the 
judiciary failed to exercise fully its rule-making power, the legisla-
ture felt justified in enacting supplementary legislation to provide 
a scheme of procedure for Michigan's courts.97 These supplemental 
regulatory efforts reached a climax in 1915 with the passage of a 
comprehensive group of statutes kno1m as the Judicature Act.98 
The growing realization of the need and desirability for court rules 
93 l BLUME, TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, 1814-1824, p. XX (1938). 
• . • the governor and judges as a legislature 'established' a supreme court for the 
territory and provided that it should 'consist of the three judges appointed and com-
missioned by the President of the United States.' This act, which was entitled 'AN Acr 
concerning the supreme court of the territory of Michigan • • • contained the follow-
ing important sections: • . • 'Section 9. And be it enacted, That the supreme court 
shall and may, from time to time, make, record, and establish all such rules and regula-
tions, with respect to the admission of counsel and attornies, and all other rules respect-
ing modes of trial and the conduct of business, as the discretion of the court shall 
dictate. . . .' " See also 1 BLUME, TRANSA<::rIONS OF THE SUPREME CoURT OF MICHIGAN 
1805-1814, p. xl (1935). 
114 Rev. Stat. 1838, Part III, Title I, Ch. I, §5, p. 358; HONIGMAN, MICHIGAN COURT 
RULES .ANNOTATED (1949) p. v (History of Michigan Court Rules, by Hon. Walter H. 
North, Justice of Supreme Court of Michigan). 
95 MICH. CONST. (1850) art. VI, §5. Present provision, MICH. CONST. art. XII, §5. 
96 General revisions of court rules were made in 1853, 1858, 1897, and 1916. The 
rules of 1853 were adopted pursuant to the grant of power under the constitution of 
1850. The revision of 1858 reflected the changed form of composition of the supreme 
court, and the rules of 1916 were enacted after the passage of the Judicature Act of 1915. 
97 Sunderland, "The New Michigan Court Rules," 29 MICH. L. REv. 586 (1931). 
98P.A. 314 (1915), being Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§600.1 ff. "An Act to revise 
and consolidate the statutes relating to the organization and jurisdiction of the courts 
of this State; the powers and duties of such courts, and of the judges and other officers 
thereof; the forms of civil actions; the time within which civil actions and proceedings 
may be brought in said courts; pleading, evidence, practice and procedure in civil actions 
and proceedings in said courts; to provide remedies and penalties for the violation of 
certain provisions of this act; and to repeal all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with, 
or contravening any of the provisions of this act.'' 
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to govern practice led to the enactment of a statute99 authorizing the 
appointment of a revisional commission in 1927. The efforts of 
the commission were reflected in the adoption of a set of court 
rules in I 93 I. However, these court rules did not encompass the 
entire area of procedural regulation, with the result that much 
statutory regulation remained in full force and effect.100 The 
result was that in those areas where the supreme court had acted 
and promulgated rules, such rules were controlling.101 In those 
areas where the supreme court had not acted, legislative enact-
ments were still recognized as embodying the rules of practice.102 
Thus Michigan lawyers had to take cognizance of both court rules 
and statutes in matters of practice, and to choose whether to comply 
with one or the other. 
In the areas where the court clearly possessed rule-making 
power, legislative regulation was given full effect if the court had 
not preempted the field by adopting rules covering that area.103 
The case of Ayers v. Hadaway is an example. In that case the 
court held that it had inherent rule-making power to regulate the 
qualifications of persons who may practice law in Michigan.104 
The court had not made rules on the subject. The legislature 
passed a statute authorizing the creation of the State Bar of Michi-
gan.105 Court rules promulgated pursuant to the statutory provi-
sion divided membership into two classes (active and inactive) and 
restricted the practice of law to active members.100 The right of 
99 P.A. 377 (1927): "An Act to provide for the appointment by the governor of a 
commission of five practicing attorneys-at-law of this state to confer with the justices of 
the supreme court and to suggest to such court revised rules of practice and procedure 
in such court and in all other courts of record and a simplified method of appellate 
procedure." 
100 Michigan Court Rule No. 1, §3 (1931): "Rules of practice heretofore set forth in 
any statute, not in conflict with any of these rules, shall be deemed to be in effect until 
superseded by rules adopted by the supreme court." 
101 In re Koss Estate, 340 Mich. 185 at 189, 65 N.W. (2d) 316 (1954). Contention was 
made that an appeal from a probate court to a circuit court should be dismissed because 
of failure to appeal within the time prescribed by statute. The supreme court noted 
that the procedure governing appeals from probate courts was established by court rule 
in 1949, and that such court rules supersede statutory provisions, stating: "The Supreme 
Court may establish rules of procedure governing appellate practice in the courts of this 
State. Michigan Constitution (1908), art. 7, §5; CL 1948, §691.21 (Stat. Ann. §27,111). 
The propriety of the circuit court's action in denying appellant's motion to dismiss must 
be determined under Court Rule No. 75, as amended, and without express regard to any 
general statutory provisions controlling appeals from probate courts." 
102 Michigan Court Rule No. 1, §3 (1945). 
103Ayers v. Hadaway, 303 Mich. 589, 6 N.W. (2d) 905 (1942). 
104ld. at 597. 
105 P.A. 58 (1935), being Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §691.51. 
100 Supreme Court Rules concerning the State Bar of Michigan, 273 Mich. xxxv 
(1935), §3: "Members of the State Bar shall be divided into two classes, namely, active 
members and inactive members .... No inactive member shall practice law, vote or 
hold office in the State bar .... " 
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an inactive member to represent a client in court was challenged. 
The supreme court, while asserting that it had inherent power 
wholly independent of statute to regulate the qualifications of per-
sons seeking to practice law in Michigan, held that the legislature 
could constitutionally enact such a statute.107 It is obvious that 
until an area of "practice" is "preempted" by rules of court, the 
court will give full effect to legislation in the area.108 This is a 
healthy development, for it shows the reverse side of the fine spirit 
of cooperation existing between the legislative and judicial 
branches of government in the field of procedural reform. 
Preemption of an area of "practice" by rule of court in conflict 
with legislative provision creates quite a different problem. The 
superiority in case of conflict between a statute and court rule pur-
porting to govern the same matter of practice must be decided. 
For example, assume that a court rule allowed twenty days for 
appearance after initial process, and a supplementary statutory 
enactment allowed only fifteen days for such appearance. Which 
would be effective? Obviously the rule of court providing for 
twenty days is a matter of "practice" and as inherent and constitu-
tional judicial business, it would control.1°9 Only if the court rule 
were not promulgated would the legislative excursion into the 
field of procedural regulation be recognized as effective. 
In People v. Stanley110 the Michigan Supreme Court only re-
cently has squarely indicated its attitude on the superiority of 
court rules over legislative enactments in the field of "practice." 
In 1953 and 1954 the legislature amended section 650.1 Michigan 
Compiled Laws (1948) by providing for appeal as of right in 
criminal cases resulting in conviction. Defendant was convicted 
of ·wrongfully taking a motor vehicle and attempted to invoke 
directly the provision of this new law without complying with the 
provisions of court rules requiring that the defendant first obtain 
101 Ayers v. Hadaway, 303 Mich. 589 at 597-598, 6 N.W. (2d) 905 (1942): "In our 
opinion there is inherent power in the Supreme Court to regulate the qualifications of 
persons who may be permitted to practice law in this State. That the legislature has 
seen fit to adopt legislation to this end does not make the act unconstitutional." 
10s Michigan Court Rule No. 1, §3 (1945). 
109 Berman v. Psiharis, 325 Mich. 528 at 533, 39 N.W. (2d) 58 (1949). A statute 
required leave of court to amend a pleading. A court rule permitted amendment as of 
right within fifteen days from filing date. The court held that a decree entered within 
the fifteen-day period must be reversed because it deprived defendant, who now claimed 
he desired to amend his answer and cross bill, of the right to amend as granted by the 
rule. "Notwithstanding the statute, the court rule must be given its full force and effect." 
People v. Stanley, 344 Mich. 530, 75 N.W. (2d) 39 (1956); Talbot v. Collins, 33 Idaho 
169, 191 P. 354 (1920); Solimeto v. State, 188 Ind. 170, 122 N.E. 578 (1919); Epstein v. 
State, 190 Ind. 693, 128 N.E. 353 (1920). 
110 344 Mich. 530, 75 N.W. (2d) 39 (1956). 
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leave to appeal. In striking down the statute as modifying the 
practice provided for by the court rule, the court among other 
reasons pointed out that it has both inherent and constitutional 
authority to make rules of practice; that when it makes such rules, 
legislation that conflicts therewith, even though subsequently en-
acted, is of no force and effect. The court was careful to emphasize 
that, at least so far as this reason went, it did not que~tion the 
party's right of review; but since he did not comply with the pro-
cedure established by court rule as distinguished from that enacted 
by statute, the appeal must be dismissed. The opinion is a moving 
statement in support of the superiority of inherent and constitu-
tional rule-making when brought into conflict with legislative 
meddling with practice. 
In summary, the supreme court has exercised its rule-making 
power only to a limited extent. Where it has acted to regulate 
"practice," the rule is supreme whether or not the legislature has 
also acted. Where it has not acted, supplementary legislative en-
actments regulating "practice" will be recognized as the effective 
rules of practice until such time as the court exercises its full in-
herent and constitutional obligations. Thus in the absence of 
conflict between them, both court rules and supplementary legisla-
tion constitute effective practice regulation. 
III. EXTENT TO WHICH THE RULE-MAKING POWER SHOULD 
BE EXERCISED 
The great debates of the 1920's concerning the rule-making 
power of the courts contain all of the arguments for and against 
the use of judicial rule making.111 During the succeeding thirty 
years the existence in the courts of inherent, constitutional; and 
granted rule-making power has become recognized and well ac-
cepted. Thus attention can now be turned to a re-examination 
of the claims and counterclaims of the proponents and opponents 
of judicial rule making to determine fairly its value and whether 
or not it should be used to its fullest extent in modem procedural 
reform movements. 
The following arguments against statutory regulation of prac-
tice appear to remain valid: 
, I. The rigidity of procedural statutes oftentimes results in 
injustice. Courts are bound by statutes. They cannot be sus-
pended or modified to meet situations unforeseen at the time of 
their enactment. 
111 See note I supra. 
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2. The ambiguity in legislative rules is difficult to clarify. 
The legislature, being busy with other important problems, is 
often not receptive to suggestions for clarification. Courts must 
clarify ambiguities in cases and controversies, thus making law-
suits turn on questions of practice. 
3. Although made up of competent, sincere, elected repre-
sentatives, the legislature as a whole does not have, as do the 
judges, the expertise or interest to handle the problem of provid-
ing rules of practice or of constantly re-examining them. 
4. The legislature is not responsible in the eyes of the public 
for the prompt and efficient administration of justice and often 
lacks sufficient interest to correct the administrative rules of a 
coordinate department. 
5. Legislative sessions occur only at yearly intervals. They 
are crowded with other important problems. Preliminary study 
on the part of the legislature and an understanding of the need 
for a bill on a technical matter of procedure are often lacking. 
6. Too often, needed revision is passed over by the legislature 
when no organized, effective voice is raised in its support, and ill-
considered practice provisions are passed by the legislature when 
they have the interest of one or more politically effective persons, 
thus making possible the creation of cumbersome, over-particu-
larized, and complicated machinery for the administration of 
justice. 
The following arguments in favor of judicial rule making in its 
broadest sense have been proved during the past thirty years: 
1. The courts are responsible for the proper and efficient 
administration of justice. They have proved themselves capable 
and interested in the problem of providing sound rules of practice. 
It is apparent that in all jurisdictions where the courts have ex-
ercised full rule-making power, docket crowding and delay have 
been lessened. 
2. A random comparison of decisions by courts exercising 
rule-making power before and after their court rules were adopted 
indicates that there are fewer decisions turning on procedural 
questions after the rules were adopted. 
3. As a general rule the courts exercising rule-making power 
have periodically re-examined the rules of procedure to eliminate 
inequities in the rules and to improve them.112 
112 Recently the Supreme Court of the United States took an unfortunate step in 
discharging its standing advisory committee on Rules of Civil Procedure. The court now 
has no organized committee of lawyers to advise it on matters of procedural reform. 
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4. Interpretation of the rules by the same group that promul-
gated them has seemingly resulted in an interpretation more in 
spirit with the established rules of procedure and less in reliance 
on technicalities. 
Thus just as it was advisable thirty years ago for courts to ex-
ercise their rule-making power, it is even more advisable today 
for courts to exercise this power to its fullest extent to achieve all 
of the benefits inherent in a system of judicial rule making. The 
administration of justice will be served if the court will exercise 
all of its inherent, constitutional, and delegated rule-making 
power. Responsibility for good judicial administration will be 
centered in the courts instead of divided between the legislature 
and the courts. Practice and procedure should never be an end in 
and of itself. It must be considered only as a means to an end, that 
is, administration. To function properly, the details of adminis-
tration of justice should be assumed by the court and not left by 
default to a separate branch of government. 
Although lawyers may hold different opinions as to the details 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the last eighteen years 
under the federal rules amply support the recommendation of 
the American Bar Association made in 1938: "that practice and 
procedure in the courts should be regulated by the court;"113 and 
of the Committee on Judicial Administration at that same time: 
"Where legal procedure is prescribed by legislation, it should be 
restored to the courts and defined by rules of court."114 
The following paragraphs contain a functional breakdown of 
many phases of judicial administration. In each paragraph an 
effort is made, in light of the conclusions drawn in the foregoing 
material, to indicate whether or not the matter therein discussed 
should properly be dealt with by statute or court rule. The con-
clusions are documented where authorities are available. 
Court Creation and Organization, Court Officers, and Salaries. 
There can be no doubt that the legislature, as limited by the con-
stitution, is the proper body to deal with the creation of courts115 
and the rules for selection and payment of the salaries of the vari-
ous court officials. Except for certain officials to be appointed by 
the highest court,116 no one would contend that this would be a 
113 63 A.B.A. REP. 523 (1938), Report of the Section of Judicial Administration, 
Recommendation 1. (I). 
114 63 A.B.A. REP. 530 (1938), Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration 
(to the Section of Judicial Administration), Proposal 1. 
115 MICH. CONST., art. VII, §1. 
116Id., §6. 
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proper subject for court rule. In a like manner the constitution 
prescribes the basic form of court organization with certain legisla-
tive responsibility.117 
Limitations of Actions. Whether or not a state should prevent 
the enforcement of a right because of the lapse of time involves 
considerations other than the orderly dispatch of judicial business. 
Other policy considerations such as the need for certainty of prop-
erty and contract indicate that the statutes of limitation should be 
left for legislative determination.118 
Basis for Jurisdiction. The Michigan Constitution provides 
that "Circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal not excepted in this constitution and not pro-
hibited by law .... "119 Thus the kinds of cases that may be de-
cided by the courts of this state are initially provided for in the 
constitution subject to such regulation that the legislature may 
prescribe. This involves policies over and above the orderly dis-
patch of judicial business and is properly a subject for decision by 
the people's elected representatives.120 Whether there is a tribunal 
to protect a right goes to the very heart of the right itself and thus 
involves more than practice. The same can be said of the relation-
ship with the state of the person or property involved in an action 
as the basis for jurisdiction over that person and property. 
Whether or not that relationship is sufficiently close to subject the 
person or property to the jurisdiction of a court of the state is 
something that involves fundamental policy considerations beyond 
those matters essential for the orderly dispatch of judicial busi-
ness.121 On the other hand, how such persons and property should 
be brought before the courts clearly is practice and must be so con-
sidered. If the legislature makes the determination that a certain 
class of persons or property should be subjected to the power of 
the courts of this state, the supreme court has the obligation to 
117 Id., §§2, 3, 8. "The legislature may by law arrange the various circuits into 
judicial districts, and provide for the manner of holding courts therein. Circuits and 
districts may be created, al'tered or discontinued by law, but no such alteration or dis-
continuance shall have the effect to remove a judge from office." (id., §8) 
118 Fulghum v. Baxley, (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) 219 S.W. (2d) 1014. 
119 MICH. CoNsr., art. VII, §10. 
120 Standish v. Gold Creek Min. Co., (9th Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 662, cert. den. 302 
U.S. 765 (1938); Universal Credit Co. v. Antonsen, 374 Ill. 194, 29 N.E. (2d) 96 (1940). 
121 An example of such policy decisions by the legislature is the determination that 
persons who drive automobiles on the highways of the state and have accidents in the 
state stand in a sufficiently close relationship to the state to justify subjecting them to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the state for actions arising out of such accidents. Non-
Resident Motor Vehicle Statutes. 
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establish rules prescribing how and in what manner such persons 
or property shall be brought before the courts.122 
Form of Action. A court's inherent power and the constitu-
tional provision directing the supreme court by general rules to 
modify and amend the practice of courts of record and to simplify 
the same, make it clear that the rule-making power should be ex-
ercised to prescribe the form in which actions may be brought 
and by such rules to protect the substantive rights of the parties 
as declared by the legislature. The method of bringing an action 
into court, what it is called, what it is necessary to say, all involve 
matters of practice within the power of the court to prescribe rules 
therefor.123 
Commencement of the Action. How an action is commenced 
involves questions of practice within the constitutional rule-making 
power and also involves the orderly dispatch of judicial business, 
so as to bring this matter within the inherent power of the court 
to establish rules therefor.12_4 
Notice of the Action. Although there are constitutional 
limitations upon the kind of notice that must be given a defend-
ant in an action, the form of that notice and how it should be 
served involve the orderly dispatch of judicial business and should 
clearly be considered as within the rule-making power. This 
should be true both as a result of an interpretation of the word 
"practice" as it appears in the Michigan Constitution and from 
an examination of the court's inherent power. The limitations 
122 Present court rules have covered this area of practice. Federal Rule 4. Michigan 
Court Rules 13, 14, and 15. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 
(1946). Court Rule changing statutory provision prescribing range of process held valid. 
Rule held valid which provided for service by alias writ of attachment. Van Benschoten 
v. Fales, 126 Mich. 176, 85 N.W. 476 (1901). Practice includes the mode of serving mesne 
process and the mode of executing final process. It refers to the manner in which attach-
ment and fieri facias writs are to be levied. Union Nat. Bank v. Byram, 131 Ill. 92, 22 
N.E. 842 (1889). Practice includes the time and mode of issuing and returning final 
process in ejectment suits. Wilson v. Trustees of Scll.ools, 138 Ill. 285, 27 N.E. 1103 
(1891). Practice includes the mode of serving process. J. E. Petty & Co. v. Dock Con-
tractor Co., (3d Cir. 1922) 283 F. 341. A court rule which stated that service of notice 
by registered mail was to be deemed valid if delivered to addressee or any other person 
qualified to receive addressee's registered mail was valid. (dicta) Wise v. Herzog, (D.C. 
Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 486. 
123 State v. Bogart, 41 N.M. 1, 62 P. (2d) 1149 (1936); State v. Ahrens, 25 N.J. Super. 
201, 95 A. (2d) 755 (1953). The form an appeal should take as prescribed by court rule 
was sustained in Michigan. Jones v. Eastern Michigan Motorbuses, 287 Mich. 619, 283 
N.W. 710 (1939). 
124 Example Federal Rule 3. Rule held valid which provided for the time within 
which appearance should be made on notice to plead. Norvell v. McHenry, 1 Mich. 
227 (1849). 
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upon the kind of notice that may be prescribed by the court in its 
rules are the limitations of due process of law. All notice must 
be reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the action 
and give him an opportunity to defend.125 The notice that must 
be given a defendant must be distinguished from the basis for the 
exercise of jurisdiction. The basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, 
that is, the relationship that exists between the defendant or the 
property and the state, is a legislative matter.126 Within the 
limitations of due process of law, the kind of notice to be given 
is a matter for court rule.127 The first involves matters of policy 
over and above those indicating the orderly dispatch of judicial 
business. The second involves only the orderly dispatch of 
judicial business. For example, the legislature may prescribe that 
persons who have accidents on highways in the state of Michigan 
should be subject to the jurisdiction of Michigan courts. Thus 
the having of an accident on the highways of the state is a sufficient 
relationship between such person and the state to justify the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over such a person. On the other hand, a 
court rule should prescribe the notice to be given in such cases, and 
such a rule should be valid and controlling in case of conflict with 
a legislative provision as to notice. The method by which a 
defendant is notified of judicial proceedings is a matter involving 
the orderly dispatch of judicial business and within the meaning 
of the word "practice" as prescribed in the constitutional provision 
granting rule-making power to the courts. 
Pleading and Motion Practice. What must be said in plead-
ing involves the orderly dispatch of judicial business. The form 
of pleadings, 128 whether or not and how they can be amended,120 
125 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
126 Note 120 supra. 
127 Note 122 supra. 
128 Pleadings are included within the meaning of "practice." Bond v. Duntley Mfg. 
Co., 195 Ill. App. 576 (1915); Matthiessen v. Duntley, 225 Ill. App. 249 (1922). Statutory 
enactments relating to practice and pleading are procedural and can be modified by court 
rule. State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 183 P. (2d) 845 (1947). A court rule which requires 
that an affidavit of verification and noncollusion be filed with a complaint or counter-
claim in divorce proceedings pertains to practice and procedure and is not a jurisdictional 
requirement. Early v. Early, 18 N.J. Super. 280, 87 A. (2d) 371 (1952). A court rule 
which prescribes a reasonable time for the filing of pleadings is valid. Timlin v. City 
of Scranton, 139 Pa. Super. 508, 12 A. (2d) 501 (1940) (dicta). A court rule which pro-
vides that a partnership can sue or be sued in the partnership name is a matter of prac-
tice and not of substance. Collateral Finance Co. v. Braud, 298 Ill. App. 130, 18 N.E. 
(2d) 392 (1938). A court has inherent power to make a court rule providing for the 
sealing of the pleadings in divorce actions. Stevenson v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. 
Div. 614, 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 751 (1950). Matters which may be regulated by court rule in-
clude the necessity of pleading. Weil v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 264 Ill. 425, 106 N.E. 
246 (1914). The form and sufficiency of pleadings is a proper matter for regulation by 
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are matters of procedure and practice. The methods of attacking 
pleadings,130 and the methods of attacking jurisdiction,131 involve 
the orderly dispatch of judicial business and are subject to the rule-
making power of the courts. Pleading and motion practice in-
volves practice and procedure, not substance. It involves how, 
not what. The creation of a cause of action obviously belongs to 
the legislature, but how it should be stated and the method by 
which it can be attacked in court is a matter of practice for judicial 
rule making. 
]oinder of Causes. Nothing could be more a part of practice 
than a determination as to what causes should be joined in a single 
action.132 Whether a counterclaim should be permitted to be filed 
or required, whether a crossclaim should be permitted or required, 
whether third-party claims should be permitted, all involve the 
orderly dispatch of judicial business and fall within the court's 
rule-making power.133 
Parties. The same thing that was said about the joinder of 
causes can be said about parties. Who are required or permitted 
to be plaintiffs or defendants, are matters involving the orderly 
dispatch of judicial business.134 Intervention, substitution, inter-
pleader, third-party practice, class actions, all are matters of 
judicial procedure and involve the how instead of the what. Court 
rules should cover these matters.135 
Pre-trial Practice and Discovery. One of the most important 
functions of any court is the process of fact-finding. The method 
by which the fact-finding process proceeds is an intimate part of 
court rule. Chicago v. Willoughby, 294 Ill. 327, 128 N.E. 497 (1920). A court rule which 
regulates the form and sufficiency of briefs is valid. Shoecraft v. Cain, 23 Ind. 169 (1864). 
The manner of making issues is a proper matter for regulation by court rule. King v. 
Curtin, 31 D.C. App. 23 (1908). A court rule which provides for the effect of a failure 
to deny averments in the pleadings is valid. Blair v. Ford China Co., 26 Pa. Super. 374 
(1904). A court rule requiring defendant to submit affidavits of merits or defense is valid. 
Hogg v. Charlton, 25 Pa. 200 (1855). 
129 Berman v. Psiharis, 325 Mich. 529, 39 N.W. (2d) 58 (1949). 
130 State v. Lane, 69 Ariz. 236, 211 P. (2d) 821 (1949); Timlin v. City of Scranton, 
139 Pa. Super. 508, 12 A. (2d) 501 (1940); Coombs Land Co. v. Lanier, 222 Ky. 139, 
300 S.W. 328 (1927); Crawford v. Roloson, 262 Mass. 527, 160 N.E. 303 (1928); Murta v. 
Reilly, 274 Pa. 584, 118 A. 563 (1922); Teter v. George, 86 W. Va. 454, 103 S.E. 275 (1920). 
131 Mahr v. Union Pac. R. Co., (E.D. Wash. 1905) 140 F. 921. 
132 State v. Pierce, 59 Ariz. 411, 129 P. (2d) 916 (1942). 
133 Examples of rule making involving counterclaims are Federal Rule 13, third-party 
claims, Federal Rule 14. 
134 Examples of rules involving joinder of parties are Federal Rules 19, 20. 
135 Examples of interpleader, Federal Rule 22; intervention, Federal Rule 24; class 
actions, Federal Rule 23, Michigan Court Rule 16; substitution, Federal Rule 25. 
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the practice of the courts. Whether or not a court has methods 
for judicially enforced discovery prior to trial136 or for pre-trial 
conferences between judges and lawyers137 involves the orderly 
dispatch of judicial business and is a proper subject of rule making. 
Venue. Where a case should be tried involves something more 
than the orderly dispatch of judicial business. The people of the 
state should have the power to pass rules pertaining to the place of 
initiating lawsuits. Such rules may involve policies other than the 
orderly dispatch of judicial business. Initial venue is a matter for 
legislative determination.138 However, changing venue in cases 
begun at the wrong place, for prejudice, for convenience, or any 
other cause, can involve the orderly dispatch of judicial business 
and should be subjects of judicial rule making.139 Thus statutes 
should provide the initial place of venue, and court rules should 
provide the grounds and methods of changing venue from one 
court to another. 
The Mechanical Problem of Getting Cases up for Trial. The 
problem of assignment, of keeping calendars, of providing jury 
terms, and the mechanical aspect of getting cases up for trial clearly 
involve the orderly dispatch of judicial business and, subject to 
any constitutional provisions, should fall within the court's rule-
making power.140 
136 Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 338 Mich. 274, 61 N.W. (2d) 102 (1953); State ex rel. 
Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1 (1928); T. Vidal &: Co. v. 
Beatty Brokerage Co., (1st Cir. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 98; Ollam v. Shaw, 27 Ind. 388 (1866); 
Sibbach v. Wilson &: Co., 321 U.S. 1 (1941). 
137 State v. District Court, 121 Mont. 320, 194 P. (2d) 256 (1948). 
138 Barnard v. Hinkley, 10 Mich. 458 (1862). 
130 Example, Michigan Court Rule 34. State v. Veneman, 209 Ind. 575, 200 N.E. 
216 (1936); State v. Weir, 210 Ind. 601, 4 N.E. (2d) 542 (1936); but see Agar Packing &: 
Provision Corp. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 311 Ill. App. 502, 36 N.E. (2d) 750 (1941). 
140 Court calendars and dockets can be regulated by court rules. Laurel Canning 
Co. v. Baltimore &: 0. R. Co., 115 Md. 638, 81 A. 126 (1911). Continuing the term of a 
grand jury beyond the expiration date for which it was impanelled is within the rule-
making power of the supreme court. Such is not a matter of substantive law. State v. 
Haines, 18 N.J. 550, 115 A. (2d) 24 (1955). A court rule was valid which provided that 
the three divisions of the court of appeals would hold three sessions per year in each 
of three places, and which provided also that cases would be docketed consecutively by 
counties. Savely v. Phillips, 25 Tenn. App. 654, 166 S.W. (2d) 780 (1940). Court rules 
can regulate the publication of legal notices or trial lists. McGreevy v. Kulp, 126 Pa. 
97, 17 A. 541 (1889). The time of trial or hearing is a proper matter for regulation by 
court rule. Hall v. Eversole's Admr., 251 Ky. 296, 64 S.W. (2d) 891 (1933); In re Road 
in Hamption Twp., 72 Pa. Super. 484 (1919); Hall v. O'Brien, 97 W. Va. 77, 124 S.E. 
507 (1924). A court rule which provides for the time and place of trial or hearing is 
valid. Rochell v. City of Florence, 236 Ala. 313, 182 S. 50 (1938). A court rule which 
provided that cases not finally determined within two years of the filing of the petition 
could be dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution was valid. Hammon v. 
Gilson, 227 Iowa 1366, 291 N.W. 448 (1940). 
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Trial. If the conclusions drnwn earlier are correct to the effect 
that the rule-making power involves rules having as a purpose 
permitting a court to function and function efficiently when not in 
conflict with policies involving other than the orderly dispatch of 
judicial business, the problems of the trial should be covered en-
tirely by rules.141 The method by which cases are dismissed or 
discontinued,142 continuances are granted,143 proceedings stayed,144 
cases are consolidated or separated,145 all involve the orderly dis-
patch of judicial business. The method by which jurors are 
selected,146 jury demand made,147 the method of making objection 
and exceptions,148 of requesting instructions,149 of subpoenaing 
witnesses, 150 also involve matters of practice and are within the 
rule-making power. How the court submits instructions to the 
juries,151 the order of trial, the method of making and ruling on 
motions for directed verdicts,152 the form of verdicts, 153 regulation 
of findings,154 the methods of dealing with stipulations and agree-
ments,155 all clearly are matters subject to the rule-making power. 
Evidence. Most rules of evidence have been made by courts. 
Now and· then the legislature has, as a result of policy considera-
141 State v. Pierce, 59 Ariz. 411, 129 P. (2d) 916 (1942). 
142 Pear v. Graham, 258 Mich. 161, 241 N.W. 865 (1932); In re J. R. Palmenberg 
Sons, (2d Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 935, cert. granted Bronx Brass Foundry v. Irving Trust 
Co., 296 U.S. 565 (1935), affd. 297 U.S. 230 (1936); Ptacek v. Coleman, 364 Ill. 618, 5 
N.E. (2d) 467 (1936); Workman v. District Court, 222 Iowa 364, 269 N.W. 27 (1936); 
Cheney v. Boston & Maine R. · Co., 246 Mass. 502, 141 N.E. 502 (1923); Lamb v. Green-
house, 59 Pa. Super. 329 (1915); O'Brien v. McCarthy, 306 Ill. App. 151, 28 N.E. (2d) 
334 (1940). 
143 Conrad Schopp Fruit Co. v. Bondurant, 134 Ky. 568, 121 S.W. 482 (1909). 
144 Boyajian v. Hart, 312 Mass. 264, 44 N.E. (2d) 964 (1942). 
145 Example, Federal Rule 42. 
146Smith v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 219 Ala. 676, 123 S. 57 (1929); People v. Traeger, 
374 Ill. 355, 29 N.E. (2d) 519 (1940); People v. Brown, 238 Mich. 298, 212 N.W. 968 (1929). 
147 See Petition of Doar, 248 Wis. 113, 21 N.W. (2d) I (1945). Example, Federal 
Rule 38 (d), Michigan Court Rule 33. 
148 Crawford v. Roloson, 262 Mass. 529, 160 N.E. 303 (1928); Russell v. Foley, 278 
Mass. 145, 179 N.E. 619 (1932); Jovaag v. O'Donnell, 189 Minn. 315, 249 N.W. 676 (1933); 
Maberry v. Morse, 43 Me. 176 (1857). Example, Federal Rule 46. 
149 Locander v. Joliet & Eastern Traction Co., 225 Ill. App. 143 (1922). 
150 Example, Federal Rule 45. 
151 People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934); State v. Pavelich, 153 Wash. 
379, 279 P. 1102 (1929); People v. Jennings, 312 Ill. 606, 144 N.E. 316 (1924). 
152 Example, Federal Rule 50. Legislation invalid, People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 
147 at 156, 228 N.W. 723 (1930); Bielecki v. United Trucking Service, 247 Mich. 661, 226 
N.W. 675 (1929). 
153 Example, Federal Rules 48, 49. 
154 Clark Inv. Co. v. Cunningham, 108 Kan. 703, 197 P. 212 (1921); ~chuler v. Collins, 
63 Kan. 372, 65 P. 662 (1901). 
155 Haley v. Eureka County Bank, 20 Nev. 410, 22 P. 1098 (1889); Billington v. 
National Standard Life Ins. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 68 S.W. (2d) 239 (1934). Example, 
Michigan Court Rule 11. 
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tion over and beyond matters involving the orderly dispatch of 
judicial business, enacted rules of evidence. The distinction previ-
ously pointed out between policy considerations involving the 
orderly dispatch of judicial business on the one hand and policy 
considerations involving something more than that on the other 
hand is the distinction that must be carried through into the 
evidence field. Most rules of evidence involve only the orderly 
dispatch of judicial business and should be subject to court rule.156 
On the other hand, there are rules of evidence which involve other 
policy considerations and should be enacted by the legislature. An 
example of a provision of the latter type is the doctor-patient 
privilege. The reason for the privilege involves something other 
than the orderly dispatch of judicial business. It involves the 
decision on the part of the legislature that in order to be certain 
that all persons receive good medical treatment, it is wise to seal 
the mouth of the doctor who has learned facts in the course of treat-
ment. 
Judgment. Quite clearly the rules that pertain to the acquisi-
tion of a judgment involve practice and are subject to rule-making 
powers.157 The ultimate effect of a judgment as a means of collect-
ing a debt may involve other policy considerations and may be 
proper matters for legislative action. The procedures by which 
such a judgment is enforced may involve the orderly dispatch of 
judicial business and at least in part should be subject to rule-
making power. The effect of a judgment as res judicata in pre-
venting other actions clearly involves the orderly dispatch of 
judicial business and should be subject to rule-making power. The 
same is true as to the review of the correctness of a judgment.158 
Post-Trial Proceedings. It should be clear that efforts made 
by litigants to correct errors committed by the trial court and the 
rules governing the method by which litigants can correct such 
errors, such as the motion for new trial,159 the motion for judg-
156 Example, Commission on Uniform State Laws, Model Rules of Evidence. ·wash-
ington Nat. Ins. Co. v. McLemore, (La. App. 1935) 163 S. 773 (1935); Appeal of Dattilo, 
136 Conn. 488, 72 A. (2d) 50 (1950). Riedl, '"To What Extent May Courts Under Rule-
Making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?" 26 A.B.A.J. 601 (1940); Green, "To What 
Extent May Courts Under Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?" 26 A.B.A.J. 
482 (1940). 
157 See Section on Trial, supra. Howard v. Tomlinson, 27 Mich. 168 (1873); Kauf-
man v. Buckley, 285 Mass. 83, 188 N.E. 607 (1933); St. John v. Nichols, 331 Mich. 148, 
49 N.W. (2d) 113 (1951). 
158 See Section on Review, infra. 
159 St. John v. Nichols, 331 Mich. 148, 49 N.W. (2d) ll3 (1951); Hager v. Weber, 
7 N.J. 201, 81 A. (2d) 155 (1952); Vengrow v. Grimes, 274 Mass. 278, 174 N.E. 505 (1931). 
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ment notwithstanding the verdict,100 stay of proceedings,161 
harmless error rule,162 etc., all are matters of practice and subject 
to the court's rule-making power. 
Review. The constitution expressly directs the supreme court 
to establish by general rule the practice in such court, thus giving 
it complete power over review proceedings.163 As an inherent 
matter such proceedings involve the orderly dispatch of judicial 
business providing a means for the correction of alleged errors on 
the part of the trial court. How .these should be corrected, whether 
the proceedings should be stayed, whether rehearing should be 
granted, all are matters that should be subject to court rule.164 
160 St. John v. Nichols, 331 Mich. 148, 49 N.W. (2d) 113 (1951). 
101 Boyajian v. Hart, 312 Mass. 264, 44 N.E. (2d) 964 (1942). 
162 Example, Federal Rule 61. Boyajian v. Hart, 312 Mass. 264, 44 N.E. (2d) 964 (1942). 
163 MICH. CONST., art. VII, §5. 
164 Procedure for taking appeal as enunciated in rules prevails over statutory pro• 
cedure. In re Widening Woodward Ave., 265 Mich. 87, 251 N.W. 379 (1933). Court rules 
were valid which provided that nonjury law cases could be appealed on the ground that 
the judgment was against the preponderance of the evidence. Jones v. Eastern Michigan 
Motorbuses, 287 Mich. 619, 283 N.W. 710 (1939). Procedure for matters raised in appeal 
were held to be not subject to legislative action but within the exclusive power of the 
court prescribed rules of practice. St. John v. Nichols, 331 Mich. 148, 49 N.W. (2d) II3 
(1951). Procedure for probate court appeals as enunciated in rules prevail over statutory 
procedure. In re Koss Estate, 340 Mich. 185, 65 N.W. (2d) 316 (1954). Method for 
appeal in criminal cases as provided for in court rules must be followed. People v. 
Stanley, 344 Mich. 530, 75 N.W. (2d) 39 (1956). Determination on appeal whether error 
was committed by trial court is a matter of "practice." King v. Schumacher, 32 Cal. App. 
(2d) 172, 89 P. (2d) 466 (1939). Practice includes the mode or manner of removing cases 
from the county or probate court to the appellate court by appeal or writ of error. 
Lynn v. Lynn, 160 III. 307, 43 N.E. 482 (1896). Courts possess the power to make court 
rules fixing the time within which appeals may be taken. Snider v. Rhodes, 53 Wyo. 
157, 79 P. (2d) 481 (1938). The form and nature of appellate briefs are proper subjects 
for regulation by court rule. Siesseger v. Puth, 2II Iowa 775, 234 N.W. 540 (1931). A 
rule which provided that appeals must be taken within 30 days is valid. Nudd v. Fuller, 
150 Wash. 389, 273 P. 200 (1928). An appeal is not a commencement of a new action, 
but merely a step in the original action, and thus a court rule limiting the time within 
which appeals can be taken is within the court's power to promulgate rules ·regulating 
procedure. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. Super. 30, 68 A. (2d) 332 (1949). A court rule 
is valid which requires a party to file a verified petition stating claim and facts material 
thereto in cases where the claim of report is disallowed. Wilson v. Checker Taxi Co., 
263 Mass. 425, 161 N.E. 803 (1928). A court rule which requires that evidence sum-
maries be appended to a master's report to enable court to decide whether evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the findings was valid. Morin v. Clark, 296 Mass. 479, 6 N.E. (2d} 
830 (1937) (dicta). A court rule which required appellate briefs to contain a concise 
statement of the errors and exceptions relied upon was valid. Epstein v. State, 190 Ind_ 
693, 128 N.E. 353 (1920). A court rule which required the submission of civil causes on 
abstracts of record was valid. Smith v. Guckenheimer, 42 Fla. I, 27 S. 900 (1900). A 
court rule which requires briefs to be filed within 50 days of the filing of notice of 
appeal is valid. Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 135 Ohio SL 77, 19 N.E. (2d) 509 
(1939). A court rule is valid which requires the appellate brief to contain a statement 
of the errors relied upon for reversal. Gyure v. Sloan Valve Co., 367 III. 489, 11 N.E-
(2d) 963 (1937). 
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Special Proceedings. The question as to whether or not there 
should be attachment, garnishment, receivership, etc., proceedings 
in a given state is a question of policy to be determined by the 
legislature. On the other hand, the question as to how the attach-
ments, garnishments, receiverships, etc., should be carried on are 
questions of practice to be determined by the court. In other 
words, the distinction is drawn again between what, which is to be 
determined by the legislature, and how, which is to be determined 
by the court under its rule-making power. The use of other writs, 
such as, mandamus, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, quo 
warranto, is expressly authorized by the constitution; and being 
discretionary in their nature, it is within the power of the courts 
to grant or withhold them. This is an additional reason why it is 
proper for the court to establish rules pertaining to these writs. 
Court Expense. The court has the power to incur expenses to 
carry out the orderly dispatch of judicial business.165 
Taxation of Costs. How costs should be taxed seems to involve 
the orderly dispatch of judicial business, but the policy considera-
tion as to the amount of costs involves something more than the 
orderly dispatch of judicial business. It subsumes a fundamental 
decision as to how much of the expense of litigation the state shall 
bear. This thus becomes a legislative problem. 
Substantive Law. It is clear, of course, that no court should 
by rule attempt to establish or modify the substantive law. It can-
not be denied that courts do create law by judicial decisions, but 
the establishment of rules for future conduct have always been left 
to the legislature when they involve matters of substantive law and 
the creation of substantive rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The power of a court to establish rules of practice is very broad 
indeed. It stems from the court's inherent power to provide for 
the orderly dispatch of judicial business. It is augmented by con-
stitutional provisions in certain states expressly granting to the 
supreme court the power to establish rules of practice for all 
courts of record. It is still further embellished by the wise action 
of the legislatures of a very large number of states confirming the 
165Stowell v. Bd. of Supervisors, 57 Mich. 31, 23 N.W. 557 (1885). 
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existence of rule-making power in the courts through the enact-
ment of enabling legislation. 
That the courts and the legislatures have recognized the 
desirability of close cooperation in providing sound judicial pro-
cedure for the citizens of a state is noted in two fields. The 
legislature has by legislation recognized the court's obligation to 
make rules of practice, and the court has recognized the validity of 
legislative excursions into rule making when they do not conflict 
with judicially created rules. In other wo).'ds, until the court pre-
empts the field, legislative rules are recognized as valid. 
The pattern for procedural reform, however, is clear. The 
value of judicial rule making is so great that the highest courts 
must be ever conscious of their obligation, inherent in them as 
courts, granted by the constitutions, and confirmed by the legisla-
tures, to exercise their full rule-making power on all matters of 
practice and procedure. Only if all matters of practice and pro-
cedure are brought within the scope of judicially promulgated 
rules will the responsibility for smoothly functioning machinery 
for the administration of justice be placed where it belongs and will 
the necessary constant readjustment of rules and practices be ac-
complished. The courts have the power. They must show the 
interest and bear the responsibility for improvement of practice 
and procedure to reduce the expenditure of time, effort, and 
money by litigants and dispose of cases more rea1ily on the merits. 
